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Abstract
This paper describes the assessment criteria that have been identified for use
within a self-assessment tool for risk reporting within an industrial context. An indepth review of the available literature was carried out exposing the criteria
discussed within this paper. The criteria target all areas of reporting from the
design of the reporting interface to the cultural considerations and initiatives.
These criteria will be refined and weighted using industrial case study experience
and then developed into the full self-assessment tool.

Introduction
Why Reporting is Important within an Organisation?
Learning from near misses, previous mistakes and operational experience has historically been a
cornerstone within safety management for as far back as the Heinrich, (1941) hierarchy of
accident severity where it was shown that for every major incident there were many cases of
smaller incidents and behind those smaller incidents there were many near misses that can occur
within the organisation. This concept has remained a key consideration within safety
management today with more recent models such as the Carter (2006) statistical model for
accident prevention that suggests that an unidentified incident has both an unknown severity
and an unknown likelihood and therefore an unknown level of risk to the organisation and the
process and therefore will pose an unknown risk to the organisation which may in fact be
critical to the operation
The commonly cited “Swiss Cheese” model by Reason (1998) suggests that an accident is the
result of a combination of the weaknesses in defence barriers (i.e the holes in the cheese),
therefore risk reporting can be seen as a methodology to identify the holes in these safety
barriers. A famous example whereby risks were not adequately appreciated can be found within
the Chernobyl disaster. In this accident a combination of a lack of operator experience, poor risk
assessment, management pressure and poor plant design caused the disaster (Pidgeon &
O’Leary, 2000). During the investigation into the accident, it was found that an almost identical
situation had been mitigated at a similar power plant, the operators of the plant had reported the
near miss to the atomic regulatory bodies but both regulators and plant operators did not act on
their report undermining the whole safety management process (IAEA, 1991).

The lessons from incidents have driven organisations to develop and implement safety
management systems (SMS). SMS systems take data that has been inputted from a variety of
sources that can include reports submitted from staff within the organisation. These reports can
pertain to concerns for safety, suggestions in addition to near misses and incidents. In order to
improve the amount of “good” data leading into the system, SMS systems are frequently citied
within accident reports as recommendations that should be implemented within the organisation
(Leveson, 2011). However previous studies have found that reporting systems on site are
underutilised and under used (Bhattacharya, 2012; Cromie et al., 2012; Leveson, 2011)
organisations need to monitor the performance of reporting in order to ensure that a high level
of reporting is maintained on site within the organisation. There is a considerable amount of
literature that exists that looks into the influencing factors of reporting ranging from the design
of the reporting system and procedure to the cultural elements that have to be considered within
the process. This guidance does not currently provide a unified best practice and methodology
which is one of the key inputs of the system.

Why should reporting be assessed with an organisation?
As discussed in the previous section, reporting systems are an important element of safety
management/ Maintaining compliance is a key concern for all safety critical industries
(Leveson, 2011) and this therefore causes simple compliance to be cited as the reason for the
development of Safety management systems and in turn reporting systems. The use of
regulations being the main motivational factor for reporting can introduce ramifications for a
reporting system. There is a real risk that an organisation will set up a reporting system in order
to “tick the box” and then just neglect to act on the data they are inputting which can result in a
reporting system that isn’t used within the organisation as found within previous industrial
studies (Cromie et al., 2012; Kongsvik, Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012) where the level of
reporting declined soon after the reporting system was implemented and the opportunity to use
reporting to reduce the level of risk within an organisation was missed.
In Reason (2004) a safe organisation is described as an organisation whereby there is a large
amount of knowledge being inputted into Safety Management. A complete lack of reports
demonstrates an organisation with a low level of risk awareness. In Reason (2004) a safe
organisation is described as an organisation whereby there is a large amount of knowledge being
inputted into the SMS. A complete lack of reports demonstrates an organisation with a low level
of risk awareness. In the statistical model for accident causation developed by Carter and Smith
(2006) a hazard that is not identified can have both a fully unknown level of severity and
likelihood and therefore an unknown level of risk. Therefore it is crucial for organisations to
ensure the reporting system is utilised as much as possible in order to maintain a high level of
safety knowledge. Despite this there is a tendency for an organization to implement a reporting
system and then fail to ensure that the system is actually identifying hazards etc. (Cromie et al.,
2012; Leveson, 2011), Reason (2004) argues that a low number of hazard and near miss reports
are not an indicator of a safe organization but an indicator or an organization that has poor risk
management. Therefore there is an opportunity to develop a methodology that will allow
organizations to assess their reporting system. It is proposed to have two areas of assessment,
one focusing on the individual role within reporting and a second looking at the managerial
oversight for reporting:
• Individual focus of reporting – A survey methodology
• Managerial focus of reporting – A Reporting Self Assessment Tool (R-SAT)

The R-SAT will be a software tool that will allow organizational management to assess the key
influencing factors of reporting based on the assessment criteria that will be discussed within
this paper.

Identification of Criteria
A high level overview of a reporting process was established. This was used to provide
guidance to assist in investigating the existing literature and case studies to distil the main
requirements and objectives of reporting systems and use them as the basis of the high level
evaluation criteria. The criteria identified through this process are shown in Table 1 and a
discussion on how and where they were identified in the literature is reported in the following
chapter. Once these categories were established an in-depth literature review was carried out
and the individual assessment criteria were developed:
Table 1 Assessment Criteria
Evaluation Criteria
Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory
Environment
Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of
reporting Procedure
Provision and value of Feedback

Education and Promotion of the Reporting
System
Motivation
External Influences from the Industrial sector

Sub Criteria
Regulatory Requirements
“Good Practice”
Reporting Form Design
Reporting Procedure
Feedback loop To Reporters
Value of Feedback for the organization
Value of good catches to the organisation
Training
Reporting Awareness
Safety Culture
Stimulation of Reporting
External factors

Identification of Assessment Criteria
Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory Environment
The Regulatory Environment will vary depending on the industry that is being assessed.
Typically safety critical industries such as Aerospace and the Process industry have fairly strict
regulations governing the use of reporting systems within Safety Management. To develop and
validate the R-SAT it is proposed to develop and validate two regulatory assessment criteria,
one targeting the (Civil Aviation, 2013; European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013) and the other
targeting the European Commission (1994) regulations of pharmaceutical good manufacturing
practise regulations.

Table 2 Aerospace Reporting Requirements

Reference
4.5.3

Criteria
The Organisation has a SMS Manual which communicates the SMS policy to
the whole organisation and provides the following:
• Scope of the SMS
• Objectives of the SMS

5.1
5.1
6.1.1

6.1.2

6.3

7.2

7.2.1

• Hazard Identification and Risk Management schemes
• Incident Investigation and Reporting plans
• Just Culture policy and Culpability Definitions are propagated to staff
• The SMS is promoted on site
The organisation has a process of on-going hazard identification
The organisation has a process of hazard identification and reporting using a
mixture of reactive and proactive approaches including safety surveys, near
miss reporting, hazard reporting systems etc.
Safety audits are implemented to ensure that the SMS is sound in terms of:
• Adequate staff levels
• Levels of competency
• Achievement of Safety Policy and Objectives
• Effectiveness of interventions and risk mitigations
Safety and Cultural surveys are used to examine the effectiveness of a specific
operation and can use:
• Checklists
• Questionnaires
• Interviews
The Organisation seeks to improve SMS performance, continuous improvement
could be achieved through:
• Proactive and reactive evaluation of day-to-day operations though
safety audits or surveys
• Evaluation of an individual’s performance to verify the fulfilment of
their safety responsibility
• Change Management
Safety Communication, the SMS is propagated by :
• Policies and Procedures
• Newsletters, safety bulletins etc.
• Websites and e-mail
• Informal workplace meetings etc.
Staff should be familiar with the SMS and the Organisational Safety Culture:
• Disseminate safety critical information
• Feedback explains why actions are taken

Table 3 GMP Regulation

Reference
1.8 (vii)
1.10 (iv)
1.12

Criteria
Any significant deviations are fully recorded, investigated with the objective of
determining the root cause and appropriate correction and preventative action
implemented
A review of all significant deviation or non-conformances, their related
investigations and the effectiveness of resultant corrective and preventative
actions taken
Quality risk management is a systematic process for the assessment, control,
communication and review of risks to the quality of the medicinal produce. It
can be applied both proactively and reactively.

Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of reporting Procedure
This concerns the design of the reporting form and the procedures surrounding reporting. There

has been previous research into design considerations for the reporting form. Shown below in
Table 4 Reporting System Design the assessment criteria for the form design, considering the ethos
of reporting, design considerations based on the referenced literature
Table 4 Reporting System Design

Reference
Kongsvik, Fenstad, &
Wendelborg, (2012)
Leva et al. (2010)
Evans et al., (2006).

Criteria
The reporting system is implemented with a view to reduce additional
paperwork and ideally should aim to reduce the paperwork reporting staff

Boeing Airplane
(2000), Leveson
(2011)
Williamsen (2013)
Lappalainen et al.,
(2011)
(Johnson, 2002; Leva,
Cahill, et al., 2010)
Leva et al. (2010)
(Lappalainen et al.,
2011) (DePasquale &
Geller, 2013; Short &
Keasey, 1997)

The reporting form allows reporters to share information that focuses outside of
the act of the error including influencing factors such as environmental,
workload etc.
The form is constantly reviewed for its suitability for purpose
Efforts are made to ensure that the reporting form is clear concise and to the
point
Any electronic reporting forms that are developed are intended to be easily
accessible
The reporting system is designed in such a way to require a minimum amount
of time to submit a report. The Organisation monitors the time impact report
submission has on reporting staff.

Cohen (2000) Dekker
(2012)

Reports are encouraged to report not through mandatory approaches but out of
interest for safety. Management actively reinforces this through the reporting
procedure.
The organisation is moving to a voluntarily reporting system if they are already
not at the point.

Dekker (2012)

Provision and value of Feedback
Feedback is commonly cited as one of the key motivational factors towards reporting (S. M.
Evans et al., 2006; Sue M. Evans et al., 2007; McAfee & Winn, 1989; Reason, 1998; Sanne,
2008) therefore these criteria will be looking at the provision of feedback within the
organization
Reference

(S. M. Evans et al.,
2006; Sue M. Evans
et al., 2007; McAfee
&
Winn,
1989;
Reason,
1998;
Sanne, 2008).
Williamsen, (2013)
(Dekker & Stoop,
2012)
(Douglas,
Cromie,
Leva, & Balfe, 2014)

Criteria
The Organisation laid out procedures for the delivery and objectives of
feedback within the organisation

The quality of feedback within the organisation is monitored by management
If a mitigation isn’t available or feasible, then steps are taken to explain to the
reporter why
There is a feedback loop for reporting within the organisation

Education and Promotion of the Reporting System
These criteria concerns the efforts implemented towards educating reporters and promotion
initiatives of the reporting system within the organization. These criteria will focus on the
operational
Reference
(Erdoğan, 2011;
Leveson, 2011)

Criteria
The Organisation has clear concise guidelines for the use of safety reporting
within industry

(Baram & Schoebel,
2007; Krugh &
Sommers, 2010;
Storgård, Erdogan,
Lappalainen, &
Tapaninen, 2012)
(Cohen, 2000)

The Organisation makes efforts to make staff aware of the importance of
reporting on site, and avoids target based approaches

(McAfee & Winn,
1989)
Douglas et al. (2015)

The organisation has a voluntarily approach to reporting or plans to move to a
voluntary approach
Positive mitigations are used as an example to encourage more reports
There are efforts to remind staff about the existence of and benefits to the
reporting system

Motivation
These criteria look into the motivational techniques management can implement to stimulate
reporting on site focusing on the cultural considerations
Reference
(Reason, 1998;
Waring, 2005;
Williamsen, 2013)

Criteria
The organisation has a clear culpability agreement that makes staff aware of
what types of behaviour and reports are acceptable or not

Reason, 1998; Waring,
2005;Clarke (1998b)
Reason, 1998;

Reports are seen as simply a way to improve safety and not a way to catch
people out for unsafe behaviour
The Organisation implements an approach to advertise positive mitigations as a
result of the SMS system
Efforts are made to break the seniority gradient within the organisation so that
junior staff have the confidence to report safety concerns and near misses
involving more senior staff.

Waring, 2005;(Clarke,
1998a; Sue M. Evans
et al., 2007; Walton,
2006)
(Smith, 1999)

The organisation is avoiding Behavioural Based Safety approaches and is
instead trying to help instil the attitude that reports improve the safety of
someone’s working environment and can provide a net benefit to their own
safety

External Influences on the Organization
These final criteria look at the role of external factors on the organization. These factors can
range from recent incidents within the industrial sector, litigation problems such as Freedom of

Information requests. These factors will not be under influence of the management but they can
have an effect on the reporting system performance
Reference
Waring, 2005; (Sue M.
Evans et al., 2007)
(Leveson, 2011)
(Reason, 1998)

Criteria
Efforts are made to protect reports from litigation such as freedom of
information effects
Accidents within the industry are discussed within the organisation and report
recommendations can be used as a driver for reporting
The reporting system is developed with cooperation by unions and other
interest lobbies

Further Work and Conclusions
The assessment criteria discussed in this paper will be further refined using case study
experience in the Biopharma and Aerospace industries where surveys and semi structured
interviews have been carried out to help expose additional areas of assessment. In addition the
case studies will allow the weighting of the assessment criteria to be determined to help assist in
the development of a quantitative assessment of the organizational reporting culture which
combined with techniques such as dashboards etc. will allow a safety manager to drill down and
determine the areas that will need attention and improvement. .
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